Direct controls regulate the input explicitly; for example, a limited-entry program fixes the number of vessels, or season-length restrictions close the fishery upon attaining targeted catch or landings. Indirect controls are intended to limit inputs or outputs by constraining other features of the fishery, such as gear restrictions that affect the efficiency of fishing or area closures that prohibit fishing Box 3. For all of these management tactics, ecosystem considerations could, in principle, be included in the determination of harvest strategies that address a broader set of impacts and conserve ecosystem structure and function.
Most fisheries management in the United States and internationally relies on output controls with catch quotas as a primary regulatory objective, accomplished by some input controls on gear, areas, and seasons. From an ecosystem perspective, addressing the manner in which input controls are chosen and used may be more important than the choice of output controls.
This is because ecosystem effects often result from the specifics of how fishing effort is exerted, rather than the absolute level of removal of target species. Habitat impacts and bycatch, for example, result from the level and type of fishing effort, regardless of how much is landed. In effect, this means that fine-tuning fishing effort configurations is a critical mechanism for managing ecosystem effects. Output goals are some measure of the performance of input controls in this sense.
If the fishing capacity, fishing time, gear, and areas allowed are properly set, then the output control, such as the amount landed, should serve only as a backstop against overfishing rather than as the primary control mechanism. In the next section, two conceptual alternatives are discussed for managing inputs and outputs in fisheries, namely top-down and bottom-up structures.
Fishing effort can be managed for either single- or multiple-species objectives with two different institutional structures. By far the most common method. One possible approach to address ecosystem concerns is the use of protected or reserved areas NRC a, The habitat needed for commensurate species is also protected, presuming the requisite enforcement occurs.
Well-designed closed areas or marine protected areas can be important buffers against uncertainty in controlling fishery harvest rates Stefansson and Rosenberg They can also protect against genetic changes in intense size-selective fisheries and in long-lived species with demonstrated maternal effects Heino et al.
Their benefits, however, will depend on sound management outside of the reserves to maintain fishing effort within ecologically sustainable limits Hilborn et al. The use of reserves and protected areas, or of networks of reserves, is not a panacea, but it is one consideration—within a suite of management options—for mitigating ecosystem-level impacts of fishing, especially in areas that have been severely degraded.
If set aside for a long enough time, a marine reserve of the correct size could assist in resolving issues with shifting baselines, allowing scientists and managers to quantify how much the surrounding area has changed due to fishing. Under top-down control systems, harvest target goals or limit points are set, and then input controls are chosen and implemented by some management body to achieve these goals.
A commonly used procedure is to set harvest targets or limits within a backdrop of MSY concepts, and then use seasonal closures once accumulated harvest reaches the target. Additional measures are also commonly added onto basic total effort controls on commercial fishermen to address a range of noncommercial fishery goals, including protecting species from excessive bycatch, incorporating mammal and bird protection regulations, and allowing other user services in addition to commercial fishing.
For example, bycatch may be regulated by gear restrictions e. In principle, existing top-down regulatory procedures can be adapted to account for ecosystem effects in a more explicit and less ad hoc fashion. This would involve two steps. The first would require the specification of a new set of systemwide harvest targets that account for trophic interactions as well as rules that limit ecosystem impacts such as habitat loss and loss of biodiversity. The second step would be to determine a new suite of regulatory actions to limit effort according to the modified harvest rules.
All fishermen and other user groups can play an indirect role in setting harvest rules by lobbying the Councils, but ultimately the final decisions are left to the top-most layers in the system, namely the Council membership and the Secretary of Commerce.
Therefore the tradeoffs between fishing groups are made overtly by managers or by a process determined by the political system. Top-down approaches have been effective in reducing or preventing overfishing in many fisheries, although in other cases they have failed to effectively constrain effort and avoid overexploitation.
The most important drawback of top-down governance institutions is that they maintain an adversarial relationship between regulators and regulatees.
That is, fishermen are seen by regulators as needing control and restraint, and hence their access to the resource is left tenuous and uncertain, and tightly controlled by regulations. By leaving resource access insecure, this system generates perverse individual incentives to increase fishing capacity, which must, in turn, be met by further imposition of controls by regulators.
In most fisheries, the race to fish continues as long as growing markets keep increasing prices, leading to shorter and shorter seasons, unevenly applied effort, poor quality product, and wasteful investment in distorted fishing gear and capital, all wrapped up in an adversarial process between regulators and fishermen.
From an ecosystem perspective, recreational and commercial fishermen have little incentive in a top-down system to limit their ecosystem-level impacts other than through altruism. In the race-to-fish setting, a spiral is then set into motion, with managers tasked to create ever more complex regulations to try to reduce the fishing effort. An alternative to the top-down approach is to implement so called bottom-up management systems with secure access privileges.
Bottom-up approaches still require that harvest rules be set in some fashion, but they eliminate the need to micromanage the details of effort and input decisions with regulations.
The key to this alternative system is the creation and allocation of harvest-access privileges that eliminate the race-to-fish incentives that exist under top-down management. In decentralized, bottom-up regulation, fishermen have secure access privileges to a fraction of the total allowable catch for each species.
These may be individually denominated privileges, as with individual transferable quotas ITQs, see NRC b , or they may be group allocated privileges, such as to a harvester cooperative or a community. Perhaps the most important lesson from the adoption of these systems is that, with secure access privileges, the incentives generated for individuals are radically different from those under top-down command and control with insecure access.
With secure access privileges, whether granted to an individual or group, fishermen no longer need to race to fish because their allocation guarantees them access. In this environment, behavior switches dramatically from catch maximizing to value maximizing. Fishing is slower, fishing capital is generally downsized, redundant inputs are eliminated, and new innovations in the market are stimulated to increase value of harvest.
On the cost side, these systems may require more enforcement and monitoring to prevent dumping e. In bottom-up systems with secure access privileges, the tactical decisions are left to the fishermen about how to conduct their fishing operations to maximize the value of their allocations.
While these systems have generated important positive impacts on commercially targeted species, they do not address all important ecosystem impacts of fishing. However, it is possible to modify the basic structure of the systems where access privileges are predicated on ensuring that impacts to other ecosystem components are minimized.
Bottom-up governance systems may also promote the development of fishing methods that more efficiently reduce ecosystem level effects. For example, if limiting noncommercially valuable bycatch is deemed necessary, allocation privileges for the target species can be extended so that fishermen also have allocations of bycatch determined using multi-species approaches to set reference points.
In other words, managers could set limits on acceptable levels of noncommercial bycatch, allocate these as bycatch harvest privileges to individual fishermen or groups , and allow fishermen to best choose methods to avoid using their allocations. While enforcement and accurate reporting remain an issue and are generally more costly under access privilege systems, there are important advantages to this system compared with conventional top-down systems.
For example, a multi-species fishery might be closed by regulators when some reference level for bycatch is reached. Furthermore, if a bycatch allo-. Fishermen can then either use or sell their allocations in a tradable system; every ton of bycatch avoided presents an opportunity to sell a ton.
This creates an automatic and continuing incentive to adjust fishing behavior to avoid bycatch. The same notion of trading and accumulating harvest privileges could be used to account for nonconsumptive services associated either with components of a system or even particular areas of marine ecosystems. But sustaining these decentralized incentive effects is not easy; enforcement and monitoring are important components of maintaining such a system since the incentives to cheat and underreport bycatch are similar to those in a system with directed-catch allocations.
An additional important effect of designating harvest-access privileges is that the privileges become securities, in the same sense that holding a share of stock promises access to a flow of future dividends. The importance of securing access privileges is that they generate a stewardship ethic that motivates concern about the long-term health and productivity of the system, and the privilege can and should be coupled with responsibilities for stewardship in order to maintain that access.
And with embedded values, owners are compelled to become stewards with long-term interests that preserve the values as well as the access if the privilege is tied to specific management needs e.
Because of this embedded value, there is an additional incentive to make decisions that increase long-term values. This presents both opportunities and challenges for dealing with multi-species interactions in decentralized systems.
Furthermore, fishermen may be compelled to seek out quota rearrangements with other fishermen to optimize the value of their holdings. For example, in the earlier cod—capelin example, cod fishermen might find it desirable to purchase harvest access privileges held by capelin fishermen to account for the predator-prey ecosystem effects of having a larger biomass of capelin to support the cod.
Thus the difficult political decisions that we described as being required to manage multi-species systems might be allowed to occur spontaneously under some circumstances. The implications of bottom-up, access privilege-based systems are only just beginning to be understood as new examples are implemented in the United States and around the world. Hundreds of species are managed with these kinds of systems, which range from individual transferable and nontransferable systems to harvester cooperatives, regional-area-based cooperatives, and territorial-use right systems.
The pros and cons of these have been debated for the past three decades; numerous summaries exist see NRC b. We will likely see more and not fewer of these institutions being adopted in the future. But, at this point, these discussions are simply illustrative of the possible consequences of using.
Much more needs to be discussed and more research conducted on these issues. The questions that arise relate to whether decentralized and voluntary reallocations ought to be allowed or encouraged to achieve ecosystem-based fisheries management and, if so, what rules and institutions might facilitate them.
An overarching framework does not exist within the current U. Institutionally, management is organized largely with respect to sectors of human activity: fishing, coastal development, water quality, and so forth. Even with area-based authorities such as the National Marine Sanctuaries, most of the regulation of specific activities, such as fishing, is left to specialized agencies. This system is not conducive to determining goals and tradeoffs between sectors and between users.
Commission on Ocean Policy In part, this lack of coordination stems from the statutory mandates currently in place. Individual agencies have mandated responsibilities that do not necessarily allow them to develop management actions that are more broadly based and coordinated across sectors of human activity.
With respect to fisheries, while the MSFCMA calls for conservation of ecosystems on which fisheries depend, the national standards for management plans do not clearly call for coordination with other management actions outside the fishery sector. Nor is there a clear mandate in the national standards for managing the ecosystem effects of fishing, other than through consideration of fisheries habitat.
Other existing laws, which require that management actions focus on certain single species, confound the issues. However laudable these efforts may be, they too tend to ignore the interaction and interdependence of marine ecosystems in favor of regulation on a species-specific basis.
Such narrowly focused regulation can have unintended effects when cross-linked with fisheries and can make management decisions more difficult. Resolution may be even more difficult when both partners in a predator-prey interaction have some degree of federal protection. Sea otters are in precipitous decline in Alaskan waters, most likely due to increased predation by killer whales.
Estes et al. Both are protected under the MMPA. In California, sea otters can control populations of commercially and recreationally valuable invertebrates e.
Both otters and abalone are ESA listed. As described in this chapter, consideration of ecosystem effects requires explicit consideration of tradeoffs in ecosystem services under different management actions.
In effect, the current statutory structure precludes certain tradeoffs unless some overarching authority for ecosystem-based management is created. Managing fisheries within an ecosystem context will require accounting for food-web interactions and trophic effects and making tradeoffs between species or among fisheries and other uses. In an ecosystem context, the potential productivity or value of each resource depends on the management decisions made about other linked species.
Accounting for species linkages will mean designing and implementing harvest strategies that recognize these interconnections. Single-species MSY policies are unlikely to be sufficient for future management because these measures do not take into account species interactions and food-web effects nor do they consider nonconsumptive ecosystem services.
Preliminary evidence indicates that F MSY policies can set harvest rates too high when food-web interactions occur. However, whether single-species MSY harvest policies lead to harvest rates that are too high or too low will depend on the particular species, its trophic interactions, and, ultimately, on management goals, in particular how tradeoffs between competing uses are resolved. If the impacts of alternative harvest rates have not been examined using interaction models, implementing harvest rates at some fraction of single-species F MSY is likely the best protection against immediate overfishing.
At the very least, F MSY should be implemented as a limit reference point and not a target. A variety of new regulatory mechanisms and institutions ought to be considered to help implement ecosystem-based management approaches. Successful accounting for ecosystem effects will require, at the first level, accounting for multi-species interactions.
But it will also require mechanisms to deal with new and politically contentious allocation decisions within fisheries, and between fisheries and other nonconsumptive uses. Show related SlideShares at end. WordPress Shortcode. Next SlideShares. Download Now Download to read offline and view in fullscreen. Download Now Download Download to read offline. Managerial implications and recommendations of service quality in Hotels.
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You are informing the panel of reviewers of your thesis two main things:. Do managerial recommendations need to be incredibly creative and original? No , very few things in this world actually are. However, please do not repeat common practices claiming they are your own original ideas. Can you suggest solutions that have been used in different markets, industries or time in history to apply to your context? Many interesting solutions come from the observation of other industries, different contexts and even from simply observing nature!
When you are developing managerial recommendations, consider the relevance of the problem you are trying to address. Just because something is an issue to a company does not mean that all issues have the same importance. Not at all! Poor usability destroys conversion, reduces revenue generated online and can limit sales massively.
Thus, it is crucial for any online business and must always be a top priority. On the other hand, updating a company logo is also important. However, not as important as the consequences of having a more old fashioned logo although a negative thing , might have lower impact for an online business.
Thus, consider the importance of the problems you are trying to solve with your managerial recommendations and focus on the most important ones. If you are only focusing on superficial problems, consider working on the section again!
Did you enjoy the article would like to have it with you? Simply download it! I honestly hope you have enjoyed the article and that will be helpful to you. In case you want to thank me for writing it by buying a ticket for a Formula 1 race, the closest ones for me to attend are the German Grand Prix and the Belgian Grand Prix. Here are some music recommendations for you to listen while working on this section:.
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